South Carolina Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 9

Fall 1957

Evidence
Charles H. Randall Jr.
University of South Carolina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles H. Randall Jr., Evidence, 10 S.C.L.R. 35. (1957).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Randall: Evidence
EVIDENCE
CHARLES

H.

RANDALL, JR.*

No cases arose in the field of evidence during the period
of this survey in which the Supreme Court was required to
evolve new doctrine, but several of the cases involve interesting application of settled principles. Analysis of the Records

on Appeal and the briefs indicate that in many of these cases
the evidence points were not seriously raised, but were thrown
into the case on appeal as make-weights, and were not adequately briefed to the Court. The law of evidence is complicated and highly technical. Yet in many of these cases the
only aid afforded by Counsel to the Court was the quotation of
a passage from Corpus Juris or American Jurisprudence."

Properly used, these are valuable research tools; they are not
intended as a substitute for lawyer-like thinking and research.
The Court has a right to expect Counsel to provide at least
any statutes and South Carolina cases bearing on a question

raised on appeal. Beyond that, if the materials are available,
and if counsel wish serious consideration by the Court of an

evidence question, I would think that a minimum of aid to
judicial decision would include the treatment of the problem

in Wigmore's masterful treatise2 and in McCormick's excellent one-volume handbook.3

These works supply historical

*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. On the inadequacy of citations of passages from legal encyclopediae
without going behind the text to the authorities on which it is based, note
the incisive comment of Chief Justice Stukes in Floyd v. Lake City,
S. C. -, 99 S. E. 2d 181:
Appellant cites City of Tuscaloosa v. Fair (Ala. 1936), 232 Ala.
129, 167 So. 276, in support of its contention that the ordinance
here absolved it from liability .... But the quoted statement was
only dictum, as no prohibitory ordinance was involved in that
case ....
It is interesting to note that in 25 Am. Jur. Highways, Section
407, pp. 702, 703, Tuscaloosa v. Fair, supra, is the only decision
cited as authority for the statement that: "Conversely, there is no
such duty or liability where the use of such a strip for the purpose
of travel is unlawfully prohibited." And also, that the case under
discussion is the only one cited as authority for the statement in
63 C. J. S. Municipal Corporations, Section 794 b(1), p. 107, that:
"However, a city may prohibit walking on a parkway or grassplot,
and, when it does so, it is not liable for injuries caused by a defect
therein." Thus may dictum, unsupported by authority, assume the
appearance of precedent.
2. WIGMoRE, TRaATIsE ON EVIDENCE, 10 Vols. (3d ed. 1940).
3. McCoRmicK, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE (1956).
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perspective and analysis of underlying principles, and point
out leading judicial decisions from other jurisdictions. I

would add, when it becomes available, Judge Whaley's handbook on South Carolina evidence. 4 The Uniform Rules of
Evidence, if they deal with the problem, might also be cited
to the Court; they represent the best current thinking and
command a national respect.5 Lacking the help that the above
materials would give, the Court cannot but give inadequate
consideration to any difficult problem in evidence. Perhaps
none of the cases covered by this survey required such complete treatment, and the decisions do indicate the sound com-

mon-sense approach that usually characterizes decisions of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in the field of evidence.
Two statutes enacted in the past year deserve note herein.
One Act permits the photographing and preserving of business records and the destruction of the originals, and provides
that the photographic copies may be admitted in evidence in
Courts in cases where the originals would have been admissible if offered.0 The other Act, that creating the Judicial
Council,7 will have no immediate effect on the law of evidence,
but provides an organization which can in time survey the
rules of evidence in this State and make suggestions if deemed
advisable.
Privilege-Attorneyand Client
Twitty v. Harrisons was an action to foreclose a mortgage
of real estate. The defendant Harrison pleaded payment to
one Samuel Want, an attorney, who allegedly was the agent
of the plaintiff, authorized to receive such payments. The
4. This Handbook will be published by the SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
QUAmTERLY, probably within the current year. Judge Whaley was County
Judge of Richland County Court between 1917 and 1934, and taught
the law of evidence among other subjects at the University of South
Carolina between 1934 and 1956. He is presently serving the Law School
as a Consultant in procedural law.
5. The Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and approved
by the National Conference in 1953. They have also been approved by
the American Bar Association.
6. Bill No. 165 of Acts & Joint Resolutions, Adv. Sheets No. 4, p. 179.
It would seem that the only effect of the Act is to obviate the necessity
of satisfying the so-called Best Evidence Rule; that is to say, the Act
does not liberalize the rules in South Carolina on admissibility of records made in the ordinary course of business. The Act is substantially
the same as the uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public
Records as Evidence Act, approved by the National Conference in 1949.
7. Bill No. 41 of Acts & Joint Resolutions, Adv. Sheets No. 2, p. 43.
8. 230 S. C. 174, 94 S. E. 2d 879 (1956).
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facts were as follows. On December 31, 1952, Harrison executed his promissory note for $2,500 and the mortgage, to
Darlington County Bank & Trust Co., of which Mr. Want was
President. This transaction took place in Mr. Want's office.
Payment was to be made by ten quarterly payments of $250.00
each, with interest at 6% also payable quarterly, and with
the right in the obligor to pay the whole of the outstanding
indebtedness on any installment date. On February 3, 1953,
the note and the mortgage were assigned by the Bank to Mrs.
Twitty, 9 plaintiff herein, without recourse, and she thereafter had physical possession of the note and mortgage. Apparently not until February 15, 1954, after Mr. Want's death,
did Mrs. Twitty advise Harrison of the assignment, and the
assignment was not recorded until February 12, 1954. On
September 25, 1953, however, Harrison had made a final payment to Mr. Want of the principal balance of the note and
accrued interest, in the total amount of $2,030. Previous payments had been remitted by Mr. Want to Mrs. Twitty; the
$2,030 final payment was admittedly never so remitted.
The defense took the position that Want had actual authority" to receive payments on behalf of Mrs. Twitty, and
on cross-examination of Mrs. Twitty examined her as to some
36 mortgages and other business transactions which Mr.
Want had handled for her between 1935 and 1952. Objection
was raised to this line of questioning on the grounds that the
communications involved were privileged within the attorneyclient relationship, and that the matter was irrelevant. Circuit
Judge Lewis permitted the questioning insofar as it bore on
the relation developing between the parties, but did not permit
questioning as to the details of the other transactions. Verdict and judgment for the defendant were affirmed by the
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Taylor saying:"
....

Objection to such testimony was upon the ground

that these transactions were privileged communications;
9. Apparently part of the consideration for the note was the cancellation of a prior mortgage which Mrs. Twitty held on the same property.
230 S. C. at 178, 94 S. E. 2d at 881. This fact did not seem to Court or
counsel to be important in the decision.
10. As distinguished from apparent authority. It was clear that
Harrison had no prior knowledge of the transactions introduced to show
the authority of Mr. Want, and hence no case could be made showing
apparent authority. The Court points out that on the issue of actual
authority, Harrison's lack of knowledge of these transactions is irrelevant.
11. 230 S. C. at 183, 94 S. E. 2d at 884.
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and it was, we think, properly overruled for two reasons:
(1) The testimony was offered not for the purpose of
proving the details of the transactions, but to prove the
relationship of Mr. Want to Mrs. Twitty in them; and
(2) Mr. Want's handling of such collections was not a
matter peculiarly within the province of an attorney at
law, and consequently was not within the rule of privilege. 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, Section 480, page 268. See
also Branden & Nethers v. Gowing, 7 Rich. 459, 41 S.C. L.
459.
Both grounds of the Court's decision on this issue represent
the prevailing view. On the privilege question, the existence
of the lawyer-client relationship and the scope or object of
the employment are generally held not to be privileged.' 2 Further, it seems clear that in the instant case Want was not
acting solely in the role of an attorney, if at all. He was himself a party to the business transactions in many of the other
cases, as he was in the instant case. "... . where one consults
an attorney not as a lawyer but as a friend or as a business
adviser or negotiator,... the consultation is not professional
nor the statement privileged."' 13 The trial court might also
have found that the statements were not intended by Mrs.
Twitty to be privileged. 14
Relevance-Res Inter Alios Acta
The offered evidence in the Twitty case, supra, concerned
some 36 business transactions which Mr. Want had handled
for Mrs. Twitty, in dealings with other persons. Counsel
wished to show that these transactions showed the nature of
the agency relationship between Want and Mrs. Twitty, to
permit an inference that Want had the same authority in the
transaction concerned in the case before the Court. The argument that evidence concerning these transactions was not
relevant was raised but not strongly pressed by counsel for
the plaintiff, either at the trial or on appeal. The argument
seems to be without merit. Clearly, the other transactions
between Mrs. Twitty and Want were logically relevant to
12. The qualifications of this statement and exceptions to the rule are
BICCORMIca, EVIDENCE, § 94, p. 188 (1956), and are not here

set forth in

applicable. In Sachs v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 305 Ky. 153, 202 S. W. 2d

384 (1947), an attorney was permitted to testify as to his authority to
act for his client. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, n. 6, p. 189 (1956).
13. Id. § 92, p. 184, 185.
14. Id. § 95, p. 190.
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show the course of dealing between them. The doctrine of
res inter alios acta should not apply where the evidence
is offered only to show the dealing between Want and Mrs.
Twitty, and not to show the details of the transactions with
other persons which Want was carrying out on behalf of
Mrs. Twitty.' 5
Relevance-Relationto Substantive Law
Johnston v. Farmersand Merchants Bank, 10 is a case illustrative of the fundamental proposition that admissibility of
evidence depends on the substantive law governing the case.
Plaintiff obtained various loans from defendant, beginning
November 20, 1946. The last renewal note was apparently
dated January 31, 1952. Following the execution of this note,
plaintiff brought an action for an accounting, cancellation
of the last renewal note and judgment for overpayment made
on all the loans. Defendant counter-claimed for judgment on
the final note and foreclosure of its security. The Special
Referee hearing the case ruled that plaintiff was absolutely
bound by his last renewal note and could not offer evidence
to vary the effect thereof. The proffered evidence was in
respect to various payments which plaintiff contended were
unaccounted for by defendant. The Referee's report, affirmed
by the Circuit Judge, was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court. Defendant is the original payee and not a
holder in due course, and hence absence or failure of consideration for the note can be shown. 17 The position of the
Supreme Court seems clearly correct. The renewal note could
hardly be termed an integration of the entire dealings between
the parties so as to invoke the parol evidence rule. Hence
15. 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 376, 377. In § 376, Wigmore
states the general requirements for this sort of proof as follows:
....
In general, where a habit of conduct is to be evidenced by specific instances, there is no reason why they should not be resorted
to for that purpose. The only conditions .

. . ,

are (a)

that they

should be numerous enough to base an inference of systematic conduct, and (b) that they should have occurred under substantially
similar circumstances, so as to be naturally accountable for by a
system only, and not as casual recurrences. As to the first condition, convenience requires that the discretion of the Trial Court
should control, in order to avoid the objections of Unfair Surprise
and Confusion of Issues....
16. 229 S. C. 603, 93 S.E. 2d 916 (1956).

17.

CODE OF LAWS O

SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952 § 3-845 provides:

Absence or failure of consideration is a matter of defense as
against any person not a holder in due course and partial failure of
consideration is a defense pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise.
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admissibility is governed by the substantive law of bills and
notes.
Directed Verdict-Necessity for Expert WitnessRes Ipsa Loquitur
5 plaintiff sued defendant
In Bessinger v. DeLoach,1
dentist
for injuries resulting from burns to her mouth allegedly
caused by a substance applied to a denture made by defendant
for her and which he was fitting to her mouth. Plaintiff alleged that the dentist left the substance in her mouth for a
longer period than was necessary, and that he failed to remove the substance when she complained that she was being
burned. The answer alleged due care, and that the defendant
had used methods and procedures standard in the dental profession. At the end of all the evidence, a directed verdict
in favor of the defendant was granted; the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Stukes, the Court found evidence in the record
to support a finding that the dentist failed to exercise due
care. Plaintiff's daughter testified that when she inquired
of defendant as to the cause of the injury, he told her "he
must have left it (the denture substance) in too long is the
only thing he knew, he neglected going back to her and must
have left it in too long."' 19 Plaintiff testified that the substance was in her mouth about fifteen minutes; defendant
said five to ten minutes. A fellow dentist testifying as an
expert witness for defendant said that his practice was to
set a time clock for seven or eight minutes when using such
a substance, and would check the patient before the expiration
of such time to make sure that the substance wasn't burning
the patient. The Court held that this evidence was enough
to send to the jury the issue of negligence, without resort
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The Court reiterated2 0 previous holdings that res ipsa loquitur is not accepted doctrine in this State, but that negligence may be found by circumstantial evidence. This is sound
18. 230 S. C. 1, 94 S. E. 2d 3 (1956).
19. 230 S. C. at 5, 94 S. E. 2d at 5. Analytically this statement is
hearsay, of course, but admissible under the Admissions exception to the
hearsay rule. A case directly in point is Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah
59, 272 Pac. 229 (1928).
20. Eikoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20 S. E. 2d 153, 141
A. L. .1010 (1941).
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doctrine and its occasional restatement is wise. 21 The Court
also rejected the contention of the defendant that plaintiff

could not present a case showing negligence without at least
one expert witness testifying on her behalf that defendant's
methods fell below those customary in the dental profession.
Such a requirement, the Court points out, is not necessary
where the issue is not whether the methods used by the
defendant were professional methods, but whether those meth22
ods were applied with due care under all the circumstances.
Hearsay-Admissions-BusinessRecords
Watson v. Little23 was an action for partition of property
owned as tenants in common, and for an accounting of rents
and profits during defendant's possession and use of the
property. The Master to whom equitable issues were referred
found that defendant, Lila Watson Little, was entitled to only
$1,525.23 as a credit for repairs and improvements during her
possession; testimony for defendant showed expenditures of
$7,350.50. There was admitted in evidence a ledger sheet
from the business records of Little Bros., a partnership composed of two sons of the defendant, J. W. and George Little.
The partnership had for many years conducted its business
on a part of the property involved, rented by them from their
mother. During this period, they collected the rents from the
tenants and made repairs on the property, charging their
own rent collected by them against the repairs. The two
brothers became involved in litigation between themselves,
and in that litigation, to which Mrs. Little apparently never
became a party of record, an order was issued that Little
Brothers were indebted to her in a sum determined in accordance with Exhibit A introduced in evidence in that litigation.
This Exhibit was a ledger sheet showing among other things
the amount of repairs made on the property by Little Brothers. The Court in the instant case held this ledger sheet admissible against Mrs. Little, to evidence the amount of repairs,
and the sheet showed only $1,525.23 had been expended for
21. PROSSER, TORTS 291-310 (1941).

Prosser says the doctrine "has

been the source of so much confusion in the courts that the use of the
phrase itself has become a definite obstacle to any clear thought, and
might better be discarded entirely." Id. at 293. See also PRossua, TORTS
199-217 (2d ed. 1955).

22. The Court adopted the reasoning of Evans v. Roberts, 172 Iowa

653, 154 N. W. 923 (1915).
23. 229 S. C. 486, 93 S. E. 2d 645 (1956).
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repairs. In affirming the admission of this evidence, Acting
Associate Justice Greneker said for the Court :24
It was alleged in the complaint of the Little Brothers
litigation that the ledger sheet, Exhibit A, reflected the
correct status of the account between the defendant herein
and Little Brothers. It must be kept in mind that J. W.
Little, a party to this litigation, was the same person
who testified in the present cause on behalf of the defendant. The defendant also testified. Both were testifying as to what the defendant was claiming for repairs,
the very question involved in this appeal. Therefore, we
think it was perfectly proper that these two witnesses
be examined as to any statements made in writing or
otherwise which they made or upon which they had acted
or received benefit therefrom.
Defendant cites 20 A. J. (American Jurisprudence)
1077 which sets forth the general rule that a person's
books of account cannot be used as evidence upon issues
between third persons. Entries in such books as to such
third persons are res inter alios acta and cannot be used
against persons not parties to them.
With this general rule we agree, but this same authority also holds that on issues between third parties books
of account may be used to contradict, corroborate or
explain other evidence, and entries in the books of a third
person not a party to the action but a witness therein
are admissible in evidence for the purpose of impeaching
him.
Analytically the evidence is hearsay, since the ledger sheets
comprise out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the
matter stated therein. The relevant inquiry therefore is
whether the records fall within any recognized exception to
the hearsay rule. It seems that they can qualify as Admissions
of the defendant herself, 25 and if permitted in evidence under
this exception to the hearsay rule, they come in without the
limitations which the Court suggests above. If admissible
on this ground, then no inquiry as to the Account Book (generally called Business Records, in the modern cases) exception to the hearsay rule is necessary.2 6
24. 229 S. C. at 494, 93 S. E. 2d at 649.
25. MICCORDICK, EVMENCE § 246, p. 525; § 281, p. 596 (1956).
26. This is indicated in the very paragraph of American Jurisprudence
cited by the Court, as well as in MCCORmICK, at p. 596.
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Relevancy-Hearsay-Verdictin PriorCase Not
Involving Same Parties

In Jackson v. Banks Construction Co., 27 plaintiff sued to
recover damages for personal injuries. On August 10, 1955,
defendant's agent ran the automobile he was driving off a road
and into a ditch. Plaintiff, a passenger therein, was allegedly

subjected to "severe and permanent injuries," and brought an
action alleging "negligence and recklessness." Defendant's
answer, paragraph 9, alleged that on September 15, 1953,
plaintiff had been "involved in a motor vehicle collision in
the City of Charleston wherein she claimed to have sustained
personal injuries resulting in severe headaches and pains,"
and that in an action commenced November 3, 1953, she recovered a verdict and judgment of $29,000.00 against one
Solomon for these injuries. Further, paragraph 9 stated, "the
alleged unbearable pain and suffering resulting to the plaintiff from the collision on which the instant action is based
are in large part attributable to her alleged injuries sustained
in the earlier accident, for which she had already received a
verdict in the neighborhood of $29,000.00." On plaintiff's
motion to strike this paragraph as irrelevant, the court refused to strike the entire paragraph, but ruled that all allegations with reference to the previous action be eliminated.
In affirming, the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Oxner,

said :28
It must be conceded, and the Court below evidently so
concluded, that appellant (defendant) is entitled to show
fully the nature and extent of the injuries received by
respondent in the previous accident. (Citing and discussing Morrissey v. Connecticut Valley St. Ry. Co., 233 Mass.
554, 124 N. E. 435, and Jones v. St. John, Tex. Civ. App.,
178 S.W. 2d 181, 183.)....
We agree with the Court below that the amount recovered by respondent in the previous action is irrelevant.
Apart from the fact that the verdict in that case doubtless involved various other elements of damages besides
future pain and suffering, it is immaterial whether in
that action she was adequately or inadequately compensated or, in fact, whether she recovered at all. Suppose she had been unsuccessful, could respondent have
27. 229 S. C. 461, 93 S. E. 2d 604 (1956).
28. 229 S. C. at 464, 93 S. E. 2d at 606.
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shown that fact on the trial of the instant case? We
think not....
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be
stated that it does not necessarily follow from what has
been said that appellant will be precluded at the trial
from referring to the previous litigation. This depends
on circumstances which we cannot now anticipate. It
may then develop that the claims made by respondent in
the previous action are relevant.
This is a wise resolution of an intricate problem. The only
evidence relating to the previous trial which the Supreme
Court definitely excludes is the verdict therein; this should
be excluded as hearsay, as well as for the reasons which the
Court gives above. The scope of this survey does not permit
of full discussion of the problems involved in admissibility
of other evidence concerning the earlier trial. It will here
suffice to point out a few considerations governing the decision. Defendant is not offering the evidence merely to
show a propensity on plaintiff's part to bring personal injury
suits, to permit an inference of lack of merit in the instant
suit.20 He says that the very injuries claimed by plaintiff in
this case were those claimed by her in the earlier case. If
defendant can prove the underlying facts here, the evidence
is highly relevant. Then the question is whether its usefulness is outweighed by the prejudice which it might arouse in
the jury. Furthermore, parts of the pleadings and testimony
of the plaintiff in the earlier case might be admissible under
the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. Finally, defendant might be permitted to cross-examine plaintiff concerning the previous case, even if not permitted to introduce
the evidence on direct examination.3 0
Hearsay-Scope of Cross-Examination---Prejudicial
Testimony
Schreiberg v. Southern Coatings & Chemical Co.3 1 involved
several interesting procedure and evidence questions. The
action was for damages alleged cutting and removing timber
which was excluded from plaintiff's timber deed to defendant.
Plaintiff's deed to defendant Southern granted the right to cut
pine timber of twelve inches and upward stump diameter, to29. McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 156, p. 325; § 163, p. 344.
30. Id. § 163.
31. 231 S. C. 69, 97 S. E. 2d 214 (1957).
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gether with such small timber and trees as would be usefully removed in cutting, removing or handling the deeded
timber. Defendant's answer alleged that he sold a portion
of the timber to codefendant Overton Mfg. Co., and that any
timber removed in excess of that deeded was cut by Overton
without authority or consent of Southern. Plaintiff's demurrer to this defense was overruled, plaintiff not appealing
this ruling. The Circuit Court after evidence granted nonsuit
as to both defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed this
ruling as to Southern, 32 but reversed as to Overton; there
was evidence to support a verdict against the latter.
Plaintiff offered evidence that Overton had submitted a
bid for the timber offered for sale by plaintiff, the Overton
bid being based on pine stump diameter of ten inches. This
bid had been rejected and that of Southern, based on twelve
inch diameter, accepted. The Supreme Court held that it
was error to exclude this evidence; it showed Overton's desire, and hence was relevant to show intention of Overton to
cut timber of ten inches diameter. It was also relevant on
plaintiff's issue of punitive damages, as showing wilfulness.
This ruling is sound. 33
Plaintiff also offered a letter from Southern to plaintiff,
which said that the cutting had been completed, and which
acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's complaint of undercutting;
the trial court excluded this document. The Supreme Court
said :34
.... Southern Coatings is now out of the case perforce
the nonsuit, which we affirm as to it. As to the remaining
defendant, Overton, the letter would be hearsay, and
inadmissible.
Presumably there is no issue in the case as to defendant receiving notice from plaintiff of a claim of undercutting; on
such an issue the letter would not be hearsay. On an issue
as to whether timber was actually cut in violation of the
agreement, the letter is clearly hearsay. It would appear
equally clear that it was inadmissible hearsay even were
Southern still in the case, since it seems to contain no admission of fact by Southern concerning excess cutting.
32. On the ground that by plaintiff's failure to appeal, the decision
of the trial court that the answer stated a defense became the law of the

case.

33. The governing considerations are set out in McCowIcK, EVIDENCE
§§ 151, 152, pp. 314-321 (1956).

34. 97 S. E. 2d at 216.
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On cross-examination, one of the plaintiffs was asked by
defendant's counsel about the prior existence of a liquor still
on their property, which questioning the Court permitted over
objection. The Supreme Court held that this was error; the
testimony had no relevance to any issue in the case, and was
highly prejudicial. The only legitimate use of the testimony
would be for impeachment; such cross-examination should
be limited to crimes affecting credibility. 3 5 As Chief Justice
Stukes said :"
Here there is no contention that the witness was
....
engaged in the operation of the still or had any guilty
knowledge of its existence on his property, much less
that he had been indicted in connection with it.
Parol Evidence Rule
One issue raised by the pleadings in Heath Springs Light &
Power Co. v. Lynches River Cooperative," was an allegation
that the cooperative utility breached a non-competition agreement with the private utility by selling power to certain customers. The private utility had entered an agreement with
the cooperative to sell it a certain power transmission line.
One term of this agreement contained a promise by the cooperative not to sell power from this line without the written
consent of the Grantor. This agreement was not to become
effective until the approval of the Administrator of the
Rural Electrification Administration, a Federal agency, had
been received. The Administrator refused approval because
of the non-competition clause. The utilities then entered an
amended agreement which contained a clause in which the
cooperative agreed not to sell to customers "now or hereafter receiving electric service from seller in the area immediately contiguous to said line without the written consent
" This agreement also never became effective
of seller ...
because the Administrator's consent was withheld. Finally,
on December 31, 1943, an agreement was executed and be35. Citing Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 204 S. C. 374,
29 S. E. 2d 488 (1944). McCormICx, EVIDENCE, § 42, p. 88 (1956), points
out that this is the minority view. Wigmore is characteristically blunt
in stating the reasons behind the minority rule. The American bar is
not to be trusted as is the English to exercise a wise discretion in crossexamination; the American trial courts in many jurisdictions have been
so denuded of traditional judicial power that they are not to be trusted to

keep counsel within the bounds of propriety in cross-examination. WiaMORE, EVMENCE §§ 983, 987 (3rd ed. 1940).
36. 97 S. E. 2d at 217.
37. 231 S. C. 34, 97 S. E. 2d 79 (1957).
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came effective, this agreement containing no non-competition
clause. Plaintiff, the private utility, brought suit to enjoin
sales by the cooperative in the area. Plaintiff offered evidence
that the parties had reached a gentlemen's parol agreement
that defendant would not compete. The Circuit Judge, J.
Henry Johnson, held that this evidence was barred by the
parol evidence rule, saying :38
...
. There is no fraud alleged or attempted to be
proven by the plaintiff. This is not a suit to vacate, modify or reform the deed or agreement and the defendant
is bound by the terms of the written instrument. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina has invariably followed
the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or
contradict the terms of a written contract and parol reservations or exceptions made either at or before the
making of a deed are merged therein and cannot be
allowed to alter or modify its legal effect. (Citing cases.)
This opinion was adopted by the Supreme Court.
A case stating the same principles is Butler v. Schilletter,30
in which Circuit Judge, Judge Bellinger, granted a motion
to strike paragraphs of defendant's answer which would vary
and alter the terms of the written contract involved. The
Supreme Court per curiam affirmed this ruling, finding that
the contract was clear and unambiguous and that no question
of reformation had been raised. The decree of the Court was
modified in other respects not here applicable and remanded.
McJunkin Corp. v. City of Orangeburg40 also involved a routine application of the parol evidence rule.
Functionof Referee in Ruling on Admissibility of

Evidence
Under CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1409,
a Referee has the duty of ruling on the competency, relevancy
and admissibility of offered testimony, but must take the testimony whether he thinks it admissible or not, incorporating it
not in his report but in an appendix thereto, if he considers
it not admissible. Elrod v. Elrod,41 an action for divorce, was
referred by consent of the parties to the Probate Judge of
Anderson County as Special Referee. Defendant made a mo38. 97 S. E. 2d at 83.

39. 230 S. C. 552, 96 S. E. 2d 661 (1957).
40. 238 F. 2d 528 (4th Cir. 1956).
41. 230 S. C. 109, 94 S. E. 2d 237 (1956).
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tion to amend her answer by alleging certain facts concerning
the behavior of her husband during the marriage. The Circuit
Judge denied the motion, but said in his order that most of
these facts could be introduced anyway under defendant's general denial. Defendant then made offers of proof at the trial,
raising generally the issues that would have been presented
under the proposed offered amendment to her answer. The
Referee rejected much of this evidence, saying,42 "The (Circuit) Judge couldn't rule what could be introduced in my Court
-he can't tell me what I shall take and what I shall not take.
He is a higher judge, but ....
" The Circuit Judge found
that this was error, but attempted to obviate the error by
considering all the offers of proof of the attorney for defendant. This was reversed by the Supreme Court, which
held that the Referee must take the testimony even if he
thinks it inadmissible.
The words of the Statute seem to demand this result. The
short answer to the point raised by the Probate Judge is that
when he sits as Referee, he is not sitting "in his Court." His
function is that of Referee, and he is bound by the statutes
governing that function, as would be any lawyer appointed
as Referee.
Nonsuit
In Chastain v. United Insurance Co.,43 plaintiff Dollye
Chastain was induced by defendant's agent, one Jordan, to
take out a hospital and sickness benefits policy issued by
defendant, an Illinois corporation. The insuring clause of
the policy provided benefits "against loss of time on account
of sickness contracted during the term of the policy." The
policy was issued on January 17, 1955; on February 26, 1955,
Dr. Harris, plaintiff's surgeon, performed an operation on
her and removed both her breasts. At the trial, Dr. Harris
testified on direct examination that this operation was for
"a recurrence of a tumor of the left breast and also a recurrence of the right breast and a tumor in it." 44 "The first
time I operated on her for it was on October 10, 1951. ' ' 45 He
also testified on cross-examination that the tumors which
occasioned the February, 1955, operation were bound to have
been there for six, seven or eight months prior to the opera42. 230 S. C. at 113, 94 S. E. 2d at 238, Record on Appeal at 68.
43. 230 S. C. 465, 96 S. E. 2d 464 (1957).
44. Transcript of Record, p. 38.

45. Id. at 39.
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tion. Held, the Trial Court properly granted a nonsuit, since
from the surgeon's testimony no other conclusion is possible
than that the disease requiring the operation pre-existed the
46
issuance of the policy.
MiscellaneousEvidence Questions
A few decisions involving routine applications of accepted
principles may be noted. Watson v. Little, supra,47 held that
in an equity case, findings of fact by a Master, concurred in
by the Circuit Judge, would not be upset on appeal unless
without evidentiary support or against the clear preponderance of the evidence. The Court found adequate evidentiary

support in the Record for the findings of the Master. In
Barnett v. Charleston & Western CarolinaRy. Co.,48 the issue
was whether plaintiff was as a matter of law guilty of gross
and wilful contributory negligence. The Supreme Court held
that the evidence was adequate to support a jury finding for
the plaintiff.

46. The Court also found that defendant was within its legal rights
under the policy when it refused further payments of premiums. Since
counsel agreed that this could not affect claims arising while the policy
was admittedly in force, this ruling had no bearing on the point discussed
herein.
47. Discussed above under Hearsay, p. -.

48. 230 S. C. 525, 96 S. E. 2d 555 (1957).
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